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GAMBLE V. UNITED STATES: 
A COMMENTARY 
KAYLA MULLEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution promises 
that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb.”1 Long recognized as a fundamental 
right in Western legal thought, this bar on subsequent prosecutions for 
the same conduct was brought to the United States through English 
common law, and is enshrined today in various forms not only in the 
Constitution, “but in the jurisprudence or constitutions of every [U.S.] 
state, as well as most foreign nations.”2 This right is premised on the 
idea that the government should not be able to make repeated 
attempts to convict an individual, as recurrent prosecutions “subject[] 
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compel[] him to live 
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhance[] the 
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.”3 
Nevertheless, this lofty constitutional promise rings hollow for 
those defendants who are prosecuted by both state and federal 
authorities for the same offense. Under the judicially created dual-
sovereignty exception,4 a defendant may be prosecuted by state and 
federal governments for the same conduct, due to the fact that the 
state and federal government constitute two separate sovereignties.5 
The doctrine is grounded in the idea that each sovereign derives its 
power from independent sources—the federal government from the 
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 1.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 2.  Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 153–54 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 3.  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1957). 
 4.  This doctrine is often referred to as either the “separate-sovereigns” or “dual-
sovereignty” exception or doctrine. This commentary will use both terms interchangeably, as 
most literature on the topic does; both refer to the concept that state and federal governments 
are separate sovereigns and therefore, may each punish a defendant that has violated both state 
and federal laws with the same conduct without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
 5.  Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1870 (2016). 
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Constitution and the states from their inherent police power, 
preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment—and thus, each 
sovereign may determine what constitutes an offense against its peace 
and dignity in an exercise of its own sovereignty.6 Under this 
exception, defendants, by a single act, may violate the laws of both 
sovereigns and therefore be liable to prosecutions by both 
governments for the same conduct without their Fifth Amendment 
rights being infringed.7 
This Commentary will proceed by examining the precedents 
behind the current separate-sovereigns doctrine and analyzing the 
anachronistic results they have produced. It concludes by arguing that 
although the Court will most likely not overrule the dual-sovereignty 
exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court should examine 
how the legal and factual underpinnings of the doctrine have changed 
and, ultimately, choose to overrule the exception. 
I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2008, Terance Martez Gamble was convicted of second-degree 
robbery in Mobile County, Alabama.8 Second-degree robbery is 
classified as a felony offense in Alabama and thus, following his 
conviction, Gamble was barred by both state and federal law from 
possessing a firearm.9 In 2015, Gamble was driving in Mobile when he 
was pulled over by a police officer for a faulty headlight.10 The officer, 
upon smelling marijuana, searched Gamble’s vehicle and unearthed 
two small bags of marijuana, a digital scale, and a 9-mm handgun.11 
The state of Alabama prosecuted Gamble for possessing marijuana 
and for being a felon in possession of a firearm under state law; he 
was convicted and sentenced to one year in state prison.12 
While the state prosecution was pending, the federal government 
charged Gamble for the same offense under federal law—being a 
felon in possession of a firearm—arising out of “the same incident of 
November 29, 2015 that gave rise to his state court conviction.”13 
 
 6.  United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 
 7.  See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985). 
 8.  Brief for Petitioner at 1, Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2018) 
[hereinafter Brief for Petitioner].  
 9.  Id. at 1–2.  
 10.  Id. at 2.  
 11.  Id.  
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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Gamble moved to dismiss his federal indictment on the grounds that 
it violated the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double jeopardy, 
but the District Court denied his motion, citing the separate-
sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause.14 Gamble then 
entered a conditional guilty plea, “preserving his right to appeal the 
court’s denial of his double jeopardy claim,” and was sentenced to 
forty-six months in federal prison and three years of supervised 
release.15 
Gamble appealed the district court’s denial of his double jeopardy 
claim to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which issued a per 
curiam opinion, affirming the decision below based on the separate-
sovereigns exception.16 Gamble then filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari with the Supreme Court, which the Court granted on June 
28, 2018.17 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Fox v. Ohio 
Often cited as the first Supreme Court case that addressed the 
validity of subsequent prosecutions by state and federal 
governments,18 Fox v. Ohio tentatively laid the basis for the dual-
sovereignty doctrine the Court would later introduce.19 In Fox, the 
petitioner challenged the constitutionality of an Ohio statute that 
criminalized passing counterfeited currency,20 asserting that since 
Congress had imposed federal criminal sanctions on this conduct, a 
failure to find that the Supremacy Clause precluded the states from 
punishing the same conduct would subject a defendant to double 
punishment.21 The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause did 
not apply to the states, and thus, even if a defendant could possibly be 
subject to double punishment, the federal and state governments 
 
 14.  Id. at 2–3. 
 15.  Id. at 3. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131 (1959). 
 19.  See Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 434 (1847) (“The punishment of a cheat or a 
misdemeanour practised within the State, and against those whom she is bound to protect, is 
peculiarly and appropriately within her functions and duties, and it is difficult to image an 
interference with those duties and functions which would be regular or justifiable.”). 
 20.  Id. at 432–433. 
 21.  Id. at 434. 
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retained the power to impose criminal sanctions on the same 
conduct.22 
B. United States v. Lanza 
The Court directly confronted for the first time the question of 
whether a prior state conviction barred subsequent federal 
prosecution for the same conduct under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause23 in United States v. Lanza.24 Respondents had been convicted 
in state court of the state crime of manufacturing, transporting, and 
possessing liquor, and subsequently were indicted in federal court for 
the same act under federal law; they challenged the indictment on the 
grounds that it violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.25 The Court held 
double jeopardy did not apply because the state and federal 
governments were two separate sovereigns, stating: “Each 
government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace 
and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.”26 
Because conduct may be denounced by both state and federal 
governments as “an offense against the peace and dignity of both,” it 
may be punished by each independently without violating the Double 
Jeopardy Clause. Additionally, the Court noted that the Fifth 
Amendment only applied to the federal government at the time.27 
Therefore, a federal prosecution following a state conviction for the 
same conduct did not violate double jeopardy.28 
C. Abbate v. United States and Bartkus v. Illinois 
The Court decided two double jeopardy cases on the same day in 
1959, albeit on different grounds.29 In Abbate v. United States, 
petitioners had been convicted under Illinois state law of conspiring 
to injure or destroy the property of another and were subsequently 
convicted for the same act under federal law in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.30 The 
 
 22.  Id. at 434–35. 
 23.  Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 129 (noting  
 24.  United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 378–80 (1922). 
 25.  Id. at 378–79. 
 26.  Id. at 382. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Compare Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (applying the dual-sovereignty 
doctrine), with Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124 (applying Fourteenth Amendment due 
process analysis). 
 30.  Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 188–89 (1959). 
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petitioners challenged their federal conviction, claiming that they had 
been twice placed in jeopardy contrary to the Fifth Amendment,31 and 
asked the Court to overrule United States v. Lanza.32 The Court 
declined to do so, holding that “the efficiency of federal law 
enforcement [would] suffer if the Double Jeopardy Clause 
prevent[ed] successive state and federal prosecutions.”33 
In Bartkus v. Illinois, the petitioner had been acquitted in federal 
court for the robbery of a federally insured bank and was 
subsequently prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to life 
imprisonment in Illinois state court for the same crime and using 
substantially the same evidence.34 Due to the fact that the Fifth 
Amendment had not yet been incorporated against the states,35 
petitioner challenged his state conviction under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, asserting that his prior federal acquittal barred 
subsequent state prosecution for the same act under the Due Process 
Clause.36 The Court stated that holding due process required such a 
bar would be “in derogation of our federal system to displace the 
reserved power of States over state offenses.”37 Citing both federal 
and state precedents as “irrefutable evidence that state and federal 
courts have . . . refused to bar a second trial even though there had 
been a prior trial by another government for a similar offense,”38 the 
Court held that “it would be disregard of a long, unbroken, 
unquestioned course of impressive adjudication for [it] now to rule 
that due process compels such a bar.”39 
D. Benton v. Maryland 
Ten years later, the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was incorporated against the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in 
Benton v. Maryland.40 Overruling Palko v. Connecticut,41 the Court 
stated that the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on being “subject for 
 
 31.  Id. at 189. 
 32.  Id. at 195. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 121–22 (1959). 
 35.  Id. at 127. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 137. 
 38.  Id. at 136. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969). 
 41.  Id. at 794. 
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the same offense to be twice placed in jeopardy of life or limb”42 was 
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice,”43 and therefore, 
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.44 
E. Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle 
In Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, the respondents were indicted by 
prosecutors for illegally selling firearms in violation of the Puerto 
Rico Arms Act of 2000.45 While those charges were pending, a federal 
grand jury indicted respondents for the same conduct in violation of 
federal gun trafficking laws; both respondents pled guilty to the 
federal charges, but moved to dismiss the pending Commonwealth 
charges on the grounds that they violated double jeopardy.46 The 
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that the Commonwealth gun sale 
prosecutions violated double jeopardy, as the Commonwealth did not 
qualify as a separate sovereign under the exception,47 and the 
Supreme Court of the United States agreed.48 
To determine if an entity qualifies as a separate sovereign under 
the doctrine, the Court examines “whether the prosecutorial powers 
of the two jurisdictions have independent origins — or, said 
conversely, whether those powers derive from the same ‘ultimate 
source.’”49 Therefore, “[i]f an entity’s authority to enact and enforce 
criminal law ultimately comes from Congress, then it cannot follow a 
federal prosecution with its own.”50 Under this analysis, because 
“Congress conferred the authority to create the Puerto Rico 
Constitution . . . mak[ing] Congress the original source of power for 
Puerto Rico’s prosecutors — as it is for the Federal Government’s,”51 
the Court held that Puerto Rico was not a separate sovereign for 
purposes of the dual-sovereignty doctrine and therefore, double 
jeopardy did apply.52 
 
 42.  Id. at 793 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
 43.  Id. at 795 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).  
 44.  Id. at 794. 
 45.  Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1869 (2016). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Id. at 1870. 
 49.  Id. at 1867 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978). 
 50.  Id. at 1876. 
 51.  Id. at 1875–76. 
 52.  Id. at 1876. 
MULLEN_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2019  11:03 AM 
2019] GAMBLE V. UNITED STATES 213 
HOLDING 
The Eleventh Circuit issued a per curiam opinion, upholding the 
district court’s ruling that Gamble’s federal prosecution did not 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.53 
Because the state of Alabama and the federal government are 
separate sovereigns, the defendant’s prosecution in both state and 
federal court for the same conduct—being a felon in possession of a 
firearm—did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause under the 
separate-sovereigns exception.54 As both sovereigns had statutes 
banning convicted felons from possessing firearms, the defendant’s 
conduct constituted a violation of each law, and thus, the subsequent 
prosecutions were not barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause.55 
The Court stated, “unless and until the Supreme Court overturns 
Abbate, the double jeopardy claim must fail based on the dual 
sovereignty doctrine.”56 
ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioner’s Arguments 
Petitioner’s argument centers on two main premises: (1) the 
separate-sovereigns exception is unconstitutional and therefore, (2) 
stare decisis should not prevent the Court from vindicating the 
fundamental constitutional right not to be held twice in jeopardy for 
the same offense.57 
Regarding the constitutionality of the dual-sovereignty doctrine, 
Petitioner argues that the doctrine contravenes the text, original 
meaning, and purpose of the Fifth Amendment.58 Petitioner first 
argues that the exception violates the plain text of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.59 The clause provides, in unqualified terms, that no 
person shall “for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy.”60 
Petitioner argues that the text of the clause does not contemplate any 
exceptions and that the legislative history of the Double Jeopardy 
 
 53.  United States v. Gamble, 694 F. App’x 750, 751 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 750–751. 
 57.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 4–9. 
 58.  Id. at 4. 
 59.  Id. at 9–10. 
 60.  Id. at 9 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
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Clause supports this.61 The original draft of the clause “prohibited 
more than one trial or one punishment for the same offence,”62 and a 
member of Congress proposed to add the language “by any law of the 
United States,” which “would have permitted the federal government 
to prosecute a defendant after a conviction in state court.”63 Congress 
rejected this amendment and then chose the current iteration of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, which Petitioner argues shows that the 
drafters did not intend for the clause to admit of any exceptions.64 
Next, Petitioner contends that the separate-sovereigns doctrine is 
in conflict with the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.65 
The Clause was modeled off the English common-law rule that barred 
subsequent prosecutions and thus, Petitioner argues, to understand 
the original scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court must 
look to what the English common law was understood to be in 1791.66 
“English courts repeatedly held that prosecution in a foreign country 
would bar a second prosecution for the same crime in England,”67 if 
the first prosecution was in a court of competent jurisdiction.68 Early 
American cases also reflect this understanding of the rule.69 Based on 
this evidence, Petitioner argues that the dual-sovereignty exception 
repudiates the original understanding of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.70 
Petitioner also argues that the separate-sovereigns doctrine defies 
the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause.71 The purpose of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect individuals from repeated 
attempts by the government to convict them for alleged offenses, curb 
governmental abuse of its prosecutorial power, and ensure fairness 
and finality for defendants after conviction or acquittal.72 Petitioner 
argues that the dual-sovereignty exception does not serve this 
purpose: subsequent prosecutions are just as offensive to the 
principles of fairness and finality when they are carried out by 
 
 61.  Id. at 10. 
 62.  Id. (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 753 (1789)). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 12. 
 67.  Id. at 13. 
 68.  Id. at 14. 
 69.  Id. at 15–16. 
 70.  Id. at 11. 
 71.  Id. at 27. 
 72.  Id. at 27–28. 
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separate sovereigns as they are when achieved by the same 
sovereign.73 Petitioner also argues that the separate sovereigns 
exception subverts the “liberty-preserving purpose of federalism;”74 
the goal of federalism is to ensure the rights of the people, but when 
used to justify the exception, it instead tramples on those rights.75 
Thus, because the dual-sovereignty doctrine stands in stark contrast to 
the text, original meaning, and purpose of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, Petitioner argues that it should be overruled.76 
Therefore, due to the unfairness of the separate-sovereigns 
exception, Petitioner argues that the Court should not let stare decisis 
prevent it from overruling precedent to vindicate the constitutional 
right to not be held twice in jeopardy for the same offense.77 In 
choosing to overrule precedent, the Supreme Court usually considers 
five factors78: if the precedent had originally developed without any 
thorough consideration of the constitutional text, was built on 
jurisprudential foundation that has since eroded, was dependent on a 
factual background that is no longer existent, has been shown to be 
unworkable, and had engendered strong reliance interests that would 
be upset.79 Petitioner argues that the separate-sovereigns doctrine 
arose out of dicta in older opinions that contradicted precedents and 
contained incomplete historical analysis, and thus, was wrongly 
adopted from the start.80 Petitioner also argues that the doctrine was 
constructed around the idea that the Fifth Amendment was not 
incorporated against the states—an idea that has since changed and 
therefore has eroded the validity of the overarching doctrine, as well.81 
Next, Petitioner contends that the rapid federalization of criminal 
law has changed the factual underpinnings of the doctrine: federal 
criminal law is now much larger than could have ever been foreseen 
when the exception was developed.82 Petitioner also argues that the 
doctrine has shown itself to be unworkable: the federal government 
itself has implemented the “Petite policy” to protect citizens from the 
 
 73.  Id. at 28. 
 74.  Id. at 7. 
 75.  Id. at 29. 
 76.  Id. at 31. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 
(1992).  
 79.  Id. at 31–32. 
 80.  Id. at 32. 
 81.  Id. at 35. 
 82.  Id. at 42. 
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unfairness of subsequent prosecutions.83 The Petite policy “precludes 
the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution, following a 
prior state or federal prosecution based on” the same conduct unless 
a substantial federal interest still exists that was not vindicated by the 
prior prosecution.84 Petitioner argues that the existence of this policy 
demonstrates the government’s acknowledgement of the unfairness of 
the dual-sovereignty doctrine.85 Petitioner also argues that no reliance 
interests will be upset by overruling the separate-sovereigns 
exception, as the doctrine is a procedural one that does not implicate 
how private parties have structured their affairs.86 Therefore, 
according to Petitioner, the aggregation of all five factors counsels 
toward overruling the dual-sovereignty exception to the Double 
Jeopardy Clause.87 
B. Respondent’s Arguments 
Respondent first argues that the separate-sovereigns doctrine is 
imbedded in the text of the Double Jeopardy Clause and thus, the 
plain text of the Fifth Amendment supports the existence of a dual-
sovereignty exception.88 Respondent contends that an “offence [sic]” 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause is a violation of a particular law of 
a particular sovereign, and therefore, “[a] single act can . . . constitute 
multiple ‘offence[s]’” against multiple laws of multiple sovereigns.89 
Respondent argues that the language of the Double Jeopardy Clause 
protects individuals from being twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense and an offense does not refer to conduct, but rather to the 
“transgression of a law.”90 Thus, Respondent concludes, it follows that 
a single action could transgress two laws (state and federal) and 
constitute two distinct offences that are both punishable without 
violating double jeopardy.91 Respondent argues that double jeopardy 
jurisprudence even beyond the separate-sovereigns doctrine has 
recognized this: in Grady v. Corbin, the Court attempted to switch to a 
conduct-based approach for double jeopardy, but quickly overruled 
itself three years later in United States v. Dixon after witnessing the 
 
 83.  Id. at 46–47. 
 84.  Id. at 47 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-2.031(A) (2018)). 
 85.  Id. at 46–48. 
 86.  Id. at 49–50. 
 87.  Id. at 32. 
 88.  Brief for Respondent at 9, Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. Oct. 25, 2018). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 10 (quoting Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 84 (1985). 
 91.  Id. at 11. 
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unworkability of its approach.92 Thus, Respondent argues, applying 
the standard meaning of “offence” to the Double Jeopardy Clause 
yields the same results as applying the dual-sovereignty doctrine and 
therefore, the plain meaning of the Fifth Amendment supports not 
overruling the doctrine.93 
Respondent also argues that there is no sound reason to overturn 
170 years of precedent to overrule the separate-sovereigns 
exception.94 Respondent contends that Petitioner’s arguments have all 
been considered and rejected in the century and a half that the 
doctrine has existed in various cases upholding the exception and that 
there exists no new or compelling reason to undermine stare decisis.95 
Rather, Respondent argues, overruling the doctrine would create 
more injustice than it solves—by asking courts to determine if the 
laws of different sovereigns constitute same or different offenses, such 
an action would burden the courts and sow more confusion in double 
jeopardy jurisprudence.96 Respondent also contends that if the 
unfairness created by the separate-sovereigns doctrine is the concern, 
the legislative branch, rather than the judicial branch, is best equipped 
to alleviate such issues.97 “[A]ny such policy concerns about successive 
prosecutions by different sovereigns are best addressed in a more 
fine-tuned manner by the political branches,”98 Respondent argues. 
Therefore, stare decisis weighs overwhelmingly in favor of not 
overruling the separate-sovereigns doctrine, according to Respondent. 
ANALYSIS 
The Supreme Court most likely will not overrule the separate-
sovereigns exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause, as the Court is 
always hesitant to overturn precedent.99 Stare decisis weighs heavily in 
favor of continuity in constitutional jurisprudence, and the Court 
usually will only overrule itself in extraordinary circumstances.100 The 
Court will most likely find that the case at hand does not rise to that 
 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 44. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 47. 
 97.  Id. at 52. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 
(1992) (“[T]he very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such 
continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”). 
 100.  Id. at 854–55. 
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level and, therefore, will decline to overrule the dual-sovereignty 
doctrine. 
The case at hand, however, does raise grave concerns about 
fairness in the application of the separate-sovereigns doctrine. The 
Fifth Amendment bar on double jeopardy is firmly rooted in the 
belief that an individual should not be harassed by multiple trials and 
should not be required to deploy the time and expense to defend him 
or herself against multiple prosecutions for the same conduct.101 The 
prohibition enshrined in the Double Jeopardy Clause is “against 
being twice put in jeopardy,” not being punished twice.102 Such equity 
concerns are implicated regardless of the prosecutor’s identity, as it is 
just as much an outrage “to human dignity and just as dangerous to 
human freedom for a man to be punished twice for the same offense, 
once by a State and once by the United States, as it would be for one 
of these two Governments to throw him in prison twice for the 
offense.”103 In each case, an individual is forced to run the gauntlet 
twice for the same conduct and the distinction drawn by the Court 
between one sovereign prosecuting a defendant twice for the same act 
and two sovereigns each prosecuting a defendant once for the same 
act feels artificial and formalistic.104 Following the incorporation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment against the states in 
Benton v. Maryland,105 this distinction appears even more 
anachronistic. Through the separate-sovereigns doctrine, two 
sovereigns are able to do together what neither can do on its own,106 
in contravention of the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.107 
While the Court in previous decisions has worried about a “race 
to the courthouse” by state and federal authorities if the exception 
were overruled,108 the existence of the Petite policy seems to disprove 
that view of the dynamic between state and federal prosecutors.109 The 
 
 101.  Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198–99 (1959). 
 102.  United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896). 
 103.  Abbate, 359 U.S. at 203 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 104.  Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (“If double 
punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two ‘Sovereigns’ to inflict it than for one.”).  
 105.  See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969) (holding that the Double Jeopardy 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment was incorporated against the states through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 106.  Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 203 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 107.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 108.  See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) (“This would bring about a 
marked change in the distribution of powers to administer criminal justice.”). 
 109.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 47. 
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policy’s presence depends entirely on cooperation between state and 
federal authorities in deciding which sovereign will continue the 
criminal prosecution of a defendant who has been charged under both 
state and federal laws,110 and there has been no evidence presented 
that this dynamic would change if the separate-sovereigns doctrine 
were overruled. State and federal authorities could continue to 
collaborate in deciding which entity will prosecute the defendant.111 
Additionally, in order to proceed with a subsequent federal 
prosecution that will follow a state prosecution, the federal 
government must obtain a Petite policy approval, showing that a 
substantial federal interest exists in the case and will not be vindicated 
by the state prosecution.112 But Petite policy approvals are rare: only 
around 100 are granted each year.113 The small number of approvals 
each year only strengthens the argument that the federal and state 
prosecutors cooperate in determining which entity shall go forward 
with a prosecution, and demonstrates that it is rare that both state and 
federal prosecutions must go forward to vindicate state and federal 
interests. Although it may be argued that the Petite policy guards 
against double jeopardy,114 using prosecutorial discretion to protect 
constitutional rights is thin protection for a right that has been 
enshrined as fundamental in the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Gamble v. United States provides the perfect opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to overrule the separate-sovereigns exception to the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, and eliminate the formalistic distinctions 
that allow the state and federal governments to contravene 
defendants’ Fifth Amendment rights. In doing so, the Court will 
ensure that the promise of the Fifth Amendment rings true for all 
defendants, and that federalism is not subverted to allow the state and 
federal government to do together what the Constitution bars them 
from doing alone. 
 
 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Gamble v. United States, No. 17-646 (U.S. argued 
Dec. 6, 2018). 
 114.  See id. at 51–52. 
